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· Do economic conditions affect the 
quality of terrorism? 
 
· Are different types of terrorist 
organizations affected differently by 
changes in economic conditions? 
 
· Do economic conditions affect the 
frequency of terror attacks? 
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Do poor economic 
conditions affect 
terrorism? 
Summary: While the existing empirical literature 
shows  that poverty  and  economic  conditions  are 
not correlated with the quantity of terror, theory 
predicts  that  poverty  and  poor  economic 
conditions may  affect  the  quality  of  terror.  Poor 
economic  conditions  may  lead  more  able 
individuals  to  participate  in  terror  attacks, 
allowing  terror  organizations  to  send  better-
qualified terrorists to more complex, high-impact 
terror missions. Using data on Palestinian suicide-
terrorists, we provide evidence of the correlation 
between  economic  conditions,  the  characteristics 











Do  poor  economic  conditions  affect  terrorism?  A 
growing  body  of  empirical  literature  shows  that 
poverty  and  economic  conditions  are  not  directly 
correlated  with  the  occurrence  of  terrorism  (e.g. 
Abadie  2006).  The  lack  of  correlation  between  the 
frequency of terror attacks and economic conditions, 
combined with  the  privileged  background of suicide 
terrorists found in earlier studies (e.g. Benmelech and 
Berrebi 2007; Berrebi 2007) suggests that economic 
conditions do not have a direct and straightforward 
effect  on  terrorism.  Indeed,  our  findings  establish 
unambiguously  that  economic  conditions  have  no 
consistent  and  statistically  significant  impact  on  the 
frequency  of  suicide  terrorism  (Benmelech  et  al., 
2012).  However,  economic  conditions  may  affect 
terrorism through other, indirect, channels. 
While economic conditions do not affect the level of 
terrorism,  they  may  impact  the  nature  and  type  of 
terror  attacks.  Studying  the  connection  between  the 
quality  of  terrorism  and  underlying  economic 
conditions  makes  an  important  contribution  to  the 
related empirical literature, which has, so far, focused 
exclusively  on  the  relationship  between  economic 
conditions and the quantity or amount of terror. 
The  notion  that  economic  conditions  may  correlate 
with the quality of terrorism has been suggested by 
Bueno  de  Mesquita  (2005).  According  to  his 
theoretical  analysis,  if  terror  organizations  select 
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High unemployment allows organizations to 
recruit more educated and able terrorists 
they  can  choose  better-qualified 
suicide  terrorists  under  adverse 
economic  conditions,  even  if  the 
launching of a terror campaign and 
the quantity of terrorism are driven 
by  strategic  decisions  that  terror 
organizations  make  irrespective  of 
economic conditions. In other words, 
we  should  observe  that  economic 
conditions  affect  the quality  (rather 
than the quantity) of terrorism. 
Our  study  (Benmelech  et  al.,  2012) 
offers the first systematic analysis of 
the  link  between  economic 
conditions,  the  quality  of  suicide 
terrorists, the characteristics of their 
targets,  and  the  outcomes  of  their 
attacks. 
Data 
Our  data  combines  detailed  information  on  the 
universe  of  Palestinian  suicide  terrorists  during  the 
Second Intifada with data on earnings and labor-force 
participation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well 
as data on Israeli counterterrorism measures. 
The data set on Palestinian suicide terrorists contain 
detailed  information  on  terrorists’  characteristics, 
characteristics  of  the  targets,  and  outcomes  of  the 
attacks  for  all  Palestinian  suicide  terrorists  who 
attacked (or attempted to attack) targets in Israel, the 
West  Bank,  and  the  Gaza  Strip  between  September 
2000 and December 2006.  
Our analysis differentiates between suicide terrorists 
of high and low quality. We determine suicide terrorist 
quality on the basis of information on education, past 
involvement  in  terror  activity,  and  age.  Suicide 
terrorists  of  high  quality  are  associated  with  more 
complex  terror  attacks,  more  important  targets, and 
better  outcomes  for  the  terror  organizations 
(Benmelech and Berrebi 2007). 
The  data  on  economic  and 
demographic  variables  are  culled 
from  the  Palestinian  Labor  Force 
Survey (PLFS) of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. We use these micro level 
data  from  all  quarterly  surveys 
between 2000 and 2006 to calculate 
economic  and  demographic 
variables  at  the  district-quarter 
level.  Finally,  our  analysis  includes 
data  on  Israeli  security  measures 
and district levels of violence.  
Empirical framework 
To  test  the  relationship  between 
economic conditions and  quality of 
terrorism,  we  focus  exclusively  on 
district-quarter cells that originated 
at least one suicide attack. We assign 
to  every  suicide  terrorist  the 
prevailing  economic,  demographic, 
and  security  conditions  in  his  or  her  district  in  the 
quarter  preceding  the  attack  to  further  address  the 
possibility  of  reverse  causality.  As  proxies  for  the 
quality of suicide terrorism we use the characteristics 
of the suicide terrorists, their targets, and the outcome 
of  each  attack.  We  then  test  the  effect  of  poor 
economic  conditions  on  the  quality  of  suicide 
terrorism.  
Our  detailed  data  set  allows  us  to  overcome  the 
difficulties associated with the task of estimating the 
causal effects of economic conditions on the quality of 
suicide  terrorism.  First,  our  data  set  allows  us  to 
overcome  serious  concerns  related  to 
selection  bias,  whereby  one  reaches 
conclusions  while  only  observing  a 
specially selected subgroup of that pool. 
Our  study  does  not  suffer  from  a  selection  problem 
because we use information on all suicide terrorists—
those that died while committing an attack and those 
caught  by  the  Israeli  Security  Forces.  Second,  by 
focusing  on  districts  under  the  control  of  the 
Palestinian Authority, we do not have to worry about 
common  factors  (like  geography,  colonial  history, 
ethnic composition, political institutions, and religion 
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Hamas increases terrorist 
intensity during difficult 
economic times 
affiliation)  that  may  be  correlated  with  terrorists’ 
characteristics.  Third,  we  are  able  to  control  for 
counterterrorist  measures  enacted  by  the  Israeli 
government  in  the  aftermath  of  an  attack  that  may 
also  affect  economic  conditions.  In  addition,  the 
longitudinal  dimension  of  the  data  provides  a 
sequential order of the events of interest, allowing us 
to  observe  the  effects  of  past  economic  and 
demographic  conditions  on  sub 
sequent characteristics of suicide 
terrorists and their attacks.  
The  impact  of  economic 
conditions on the quality of suicide attacks 
Our results support the hypothesis that poor economic 
conditions  affect  the  quality  of  suicide  terrorists. 
Higher  unemployment  rates  (whether  general  or 
group  specific),  and  higher  income  inequality  are 
associated  with  more  educated,  more  mature,  and 
more experienced suicide terrorists. In particular, one 
standard  deviation  increase  in  the  level  of 
unemployment  causes  an  increase  of  34.3%  on  the 
probability  that  the  suicide  terrorist  has  some 
academic education relative to their mean education 
level.  Similarly,  a  standard  deviation  increase  in the 
level  of  unemployment  is  associated  with  a  5.57% 
increase in the probability that the terrorist is more 
than  20  years  old,  and  a  33.5%  increase  in  the 
probability that the terrorist was previously involved 
in terror activities. 
Our  results  also  confirm  that  economic  conditions 
have  a  significant  effect  on  the  importance  of  the 
localities  targeted  in  suicide  attacks.  Higher 
unemployment  rates  and  greater  inequality 
significantly increase the likelihood a city with a large 
population  is  targeted.  In  particular,  one  standard 
deviation  increase  in  unemployment  or  inequality 
induces a 17.6% or 25.7% respective increase in the 
probability  that  the  targeted  city  has  a  large 
population relative to the mean number of large cities.  
In summary, we show that there 
is  a  strong  correlation  between 
economic  conditions, 
characteristics  of  suicide 
terrorists,  and  the  targets  they 
attack.  High  unemployment  allows  terror 
organizations to recruit more educated, mature, and 
experienced  suicide  terrorists  who,  in  turn,  attack 
more important targets.  
Economic  conditions  and  suicide  attacks  across 
factions 
Several Palestinian factions were involved in suicide 
terrorism during the Second Intifada. Each was closely 
associated  with  one  of  the  three  main  Palestinian 
political organizations: Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian 
Islamic  Jihad  (PIJ).  Two  important  differences 
between these groups are in their level of religiosity 
and the extent to which they provide public goods and 
services.  
When  taking  into  consideration  that  the  value  of 
public  services  tend  to  increase  in  recessionary 
economies,  a  combination  of  the  “club  model” 
(Berman  and  Laitin  2008)  and Bueno  de  Mesquita’s 
(2005) theory of the quality of terrorism implies that 
religious  clubs  are  more  likely  to  commit  suicide 
attacks when economic conditions are bad. 
The  results  of  our  analysis  confirm  the  hypothesis 
about the effect of economic conditions on religious 
factions  that  provide  excludable  public  services.  In 
particular, we find that Hamas is the most sensitive of 
the organizations to the unemployment rate, with an 
increase  of  more  than  4  percentage  points  in  the 
number  of  suicide  terrorists  attacks  dispatched  for 
every  1%  increase  in  unemployment.  The  marginal 
effect  of  unemployment  for  Fatah  is  negative  and 
Figure 2. The division of attacks between the main Palestinian 
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statistically  significant  although  of  lesser  magnitude 
than the decrease observed for PIJ. 
Our  results  show  that  poor  economic  conditions  do 
not  enhance  the  quality  of  terror  equally  among 
different  organizations.  We  find  that  groups  that 
provide  excludable  public  services  (i.e.,  Hamas)  are 
able to increase their ability to commit terror attacks 
during difficult economic times. The magnitude of the 
effect of economic conditions on the number of attacks 
by  groups  that  provide non-excludable  public  goods 
(i.e., Fatah) is not as important, whereas the ability to 
commit suicide attacks of groups not associated with 
the provision of any public services (i.e., PIJ) decreases 
significantly during recessionary economies. 
Policy recommendations: 
Our results have several implications for the design of 
efficient counterterrorism policies. The most common 
counterterrorism  policies  aim  to  incapacitate  terror 
organizations by cracking down on their members and 
enacting  security  measures  that  diminish  the 
probability  of  success  of  a  planned  attack.  The 
connection  between  economic  conditions  and  the 
quality of terrorism suggests that policies intended to 
improve  economic  development  and  stimulate 
economic growth may reduce the quality, and thus the 
threat, of suicide terrorism.  
The suggested policy implications have, however, one 
important caveat. Institutions that provide economic 
aid geared to stimulate economic sustainability should 
pay particular attention to the ideology and political 
objectives  of  the  local  organizations  that  will  be 
administering  said  aid.  Even  if  these  local 
organizations use the donors’ aid to provide important 
public  services  (e.g.,  education  and  health),  our 
analysis  shows  that  this  aid  may  allow  terror 
organizations  to  coerce  the  local  population  into 
increasing violence and terrorism.  
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